We come now to the very last paragraph in his opening statement, and now it appears he’s trying to get back on track to meeting the first of his confessional burdens. He makes the conclusion of his argument very clear: “The transcendental proof for God’s existence is that without Him, it is impossible to prove anything.” Now, this is an assertion which needs a defense. It’s certainly not self-evidently true, and Bahnsen does not give us any reason why we should accept this claim as opposed to the claim that “without Geusha, it is impossible to prove anything.” Does Bahnsen present an argument for his claim? No. Immediately he turns the spotlight back onto “the atheist world-view,” claiming that it “is irrational and cannot consistently provide the preconditions of intelligible experience, science, logic or morality.” So, not only does Bahnsen not present an argument for his conclusion, he manages to lay another burden on his wagon. It’s getting pretty heavy ’bout now. Has Bahnsen proven that his god exists? Not yet. Has Bahnsen proven that “the atheist world-view cannot account for our debate tonight”? No, not yet. He hasn’t even presented an argument yet. He’s simply asserted the very position he’s called to prove, and he’s added some more claims to his proof deficit. It seems that Bahnsen doesn’t offer a proof here. Rather, we should call this the “Transcendental Poof of the existence of God,” for it seems that Bahnsen presumes to have the power to say “poof!” and voilá, “God exists.” That is, Bahnsen’s god exists because he wants his god to exist. Where’s the argument?
It seems, in the case of his debate with Gordon Stein, Bahnsen fails to present an argument, just as Nick has indicated.
These are the words of Dawson Bethric over at Incinerating Presuppositionalism. Dawson is interacting with Greg Bahnsen’s debate with Gordon Stein. Dawson labels this post, the meat of which you see above in a manner that leads one to believe this is his answer to Bahnsen’s TAG. TAG stands for transcendental argument for God. The idea is that TAG successfully refutes, not each and every other worldview as they come along opposing Christianity, but instead, TAG refutes the non-Christian approach before it can even get started. The argument is takes the form of a disjunction of a contradictory. A v ~A, ~~A, therefore A. Either Christian theism or not Christian theism, not not Christian theism, therefore, Christian theism. Now, the opponent will object and claim that the argument should not be construed as a disjunctive of a contradiction. Hence, the approach to TAG employs a false dilemma. [See Mike Butler’s paper on The Transcendental Argument for God’s Existence] What the opponent then must do is show that there are other alternatives available, other paths we can take. But for the Christian, it is either Christ or not Christ. It isn’t either Christ or Baal, or Mohammed, or etc. This is the power of the TAG. It takes the exclusive claims of Christian theism seriously and applies them not only to philosophy but also employs them in reason and in apologetics. It is this that Dawson and every other critic of presuppositionalism must deal with.
Dawson conveniently ignores this argument structure, opting rather to criticize other forms of argumentation employed by presuppositionalism. For example, here Dawson thinks he has something when he mockingly changes modus ponens to Geusha. Bahnsen employs Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens to argue for God. The argument would be framed thus:
Human predication –> God
Human predication –> God
/ ~Human predication
Now, Dawson claims that Bahnsen has not made an argument. It is hard to imagine that anyone could listen to the Bahnsen-Stein debate or read Greg Bahnsen and conclude that he has not made an argument. Perhaps Dawson has picked up on Ayn Rand’s method of choosing not to actually engage with opposing views but rather to employ emotion-filled rhetoric in an attempt to counter his detractors. When you read Dawson, ask yourself if he is really dealing with the issues or if it sounds like he is talking to others, making short flashy statements designed to impress the less informed. I am not saying this is the case, but I am saying it is worthy analysis.
I want to turn now to an argument against TAG that Dawson makes elsewhere. And that argument is that TAG commits the fallacy of Petitio Principii, or Begging the Question. In his interaction with another presuppositionalist, Dawson makes the following criticism: “If on the one hand knowledge and logic presuppose the existence of the Christian god, then Premise 1A and Premise 2B contain elements which assume the truth of their respective Conclusions A and B (the existence of the Christian god, or the truth of Christian theism, which assumes the existence of the Christian god), and thus the two models of TAG which Chris has presented are by definition circular.”
Is Dawson’s criticism correct? Does the argument structure assume God in order to prove God? It is one thing for the presuppositionalist to presuppose God as he goes about arguing for God and quite another for his argument to be structured in that way. The difference is that the former is known as a pragmatic presupposition while the latter is known as a semantic presupposition. There is a clear distinction between the two. [See presupposition in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy] What TAG does is begin with human experience, in this instance, human predication, and from human experience it argues that God is the necessary precondition for human predication and in order to prove this to be the case, it shows that the contradiction of this view is impossible. In other words it is the disjunctive of a contradiction. Now, Bahnsen would call it the impossibility of the contrary, but by contrary he means contradictory. Now, that this is an argument is, as Mike Butler puts it, beyond debate. Whether it is a good argument is a different matter. To answer Dawson’s charge of circularity, however, is not too difficult. As Craig admits, there is more to it than that. TAG is an epistemological transcendental argument. Characterizing it as having vicious circularity or begging the question simply means that one does not truly understand what TAG is doing.
I will structure the argument above a little differently:
If God did not exist, human predication would not be possible.
Human predication is possible.
Therefore, God exists.
What Dawson has done is confused a presupposition of an argument with a premise of an argument. This is just a different way of saying what I have already said about Dawson. Rather than criticizing the argument, he has drifted outside the argument to criticize the presupposition that lies outside the argument. One has to wonder if Dawson thinks that all arguments are free from presuppositions in back of them. If that is the case, then it is hard to imagine any argument surviving the accusation of circularity. And that seems to be something that Dawson has missed entirely. In fact, one does not have to look very far to recognize that Dawson bring his own presuppositions that serve to inform his own argumentation. Funny how that Tiger that has been let out of its cage is entirely indifferent toward the one that let him out. He will tare the man with the key apart just as quickly as he will the one that jeers his captivity. Dawson ends up being mauled by his own Tiger. And if that is not the case, then we are both faced with a toothless, classless pussycat.
We are just getting started in our review of Dawson Bethric’s blog “Incinerating Presuppositionalism.” I anticipate a few more posts over the next month or two.
For an excellent response to the criticism of circularity, see James Anderson’s post here.